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The financial side of an economy undergoes structural change through the 
development process. There is no strict progression of financial development and initial 
conditions matter. But, broadly speaking, new financial structures gradually evolve, in a 
process that can be seen as a sequence of five “stages” of increasing financial 
complexity. Understanding financial structures  is crucial for the analysis of 
macroeconomic policy in Chapter 7, since they can increase policy flexibility but can 
also constrain policy maneuver and generate risks of destabilization for the entire 
macroeconomy.  
 
National Financial Accounts 
The underlying concepts are a blend of flows of funds accounting and more 
traditional approaches. The main distinction lies in the treatment of “equity” or “net 
worth.” When consolidated economy-wide, the net worth of the business sector has to 
be the value of its assets less liabilities. According to the flows of funds, the liabilities 
include debt plus the market value of the sector’s outstanding shares. A more 
conventional alternative is to define equity as the value of assets minus debt. In the late 
1990s in the US during the stock market boom, business net worth was negative by the 
former definition and equal to zero (as it always is) by the latter. Net worth in the US 
flows of funds was positive as of mid-2008. 
2 
 
 Table 6.1 defines the balance sheets for six types of agents or sectors: private 
non-financial actors, the government, the central bank, commercial banks, a non-bank 
financial sector, and the rest of the world.1 The entries represent values of stocks of 
financial claims. Many financial instruments are included in the table. We begin by 
considering a very restricted subset of them, and then bring more claims into play in 
successive stages of finance. 
 Table 6.1 
Values of claims can change in two ways. One is through flow accumulation or 
decumulation over time of the stocks in response to net lending or borrowing by 
different actors. The other mechanism applies to outstanding shares and foreign loans 
which have explicit asset prices (a price index for equity and the exchange rate 
respectively), so their values can jump “instantaneously” due to capital gains or losses.  
 
Stage I Finance 
The simplest financial structure, which we will call “Stage I”, still applies in a large 
number of developing countries today. In normal times (one historically significant sort 
of “abnormality” is considered below), the only private assets are “money” (broadly 
construed)  and the value of tangible capital  with K as the existing stock at 
historical or replacement cost and  as its asset price.  
                                                            
1 A natural extension would be to split the private sector into households and business. 
To simplify the exposition, it is not pursued here. IMF financial programming and 
monetarist macroeconomics often consolidate the commercial and central banks into 
one sector. To allow us to bring in relevant monetary policy issues we keep them 
separated in Table 6.1. 
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On the liability side, private business and households may borrow  from the 
banks but loans from abroad  and the value of equity outstanding  are negligible 
or effectively non-traded. There is no significant market in bonds, so private ( ) and 
commercial bank   holdings of government securities are near zero. The 
government’s total borrowing, which at this stage is only from the central bank, is 
.The corresponding asset is the “full faith and credit” of the State, .  
The money supply H is the sole liability of the commercial banking system.2  In 
simple financial systems, a typical monetary policy instrument is to require commercial 
banks to hold reserves (or “high-powered money”)  against deposits, according to a 
rule such as  with  (assuming for simplicity that all money is held as 
deposits in the banking system3).  
Besides deposit reserves, the only commercial bank asset is outstanding credit 
or loans L (at this stage only  to the private sector). The banks’ balance sheet is 
, implying that  and  are linked via the reserve requirement. Boosting  
forces banks to contract both money and credit. For reasons discussed below, in more 
sophisticated systems reserve ratios tend to be minimal and other regulatory methods 
are used.  
                                                            
2 As is often the case in macroeconomic modeling for the moment we ignore bank 
equity  held by the private sector as an asset. It is brought into the discussion 
about financial regulation below.  
3 Standard definitions of high-powered money also include currency and coins, which 
we omit to save on symbols. They were key components of the rich countries’ financial 




Besides the bonds  placed with it in one way or another by the government, 
the central bank’s only other asset is international reserves , with  as the value of 
reserves in foreign currency and e as the exchange rate (units of local currency per unit 
of foreign currency). Consolidating the accounts of the central and commercial banks 
shows that the money supply is given by the equation , so that it is 
equal to total domestic credit plus foreign reserves. As will be seen below, formulas of 
this sort play a central role in monetarist macroeconomics in general and its particular 
incarnation in the form of IMF financial programming. 
Liquidity is often interpreted as a measure of the financial flexibility of an 
individual actor, group of actors, or the financial system as whole. It constitutes 
“wherewithal” -- the resources readily available for purposes of capital formation or 
financial transactions. For the private sector in Stage I, liquidity takes the form of one 
asset, namely money. Nothing else is at hand. 
 The accounting framework just sketched puts strict limitations on policy options. 
First, it is the preferred arena for the IMF’s venerable version of open economy 
monetarism. Suppose that money demand is described by the equation of exchange 
 with P as the price level, X as output, and V as an institutionally determined 
“velocity” of circulation of money, which in the most simple frameworks is assumed to 
be constant. If X is set by “full employment” and P comes from an inflation forecast or 
target, then money demand must follow.  
Suppose, somewhat mysteriously, that money demand is always equal to supply, 
. If loans  to the private sector are set by needs of production, the sum of bank 
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loans to the government and international reserves is determined from the consolidated 
banking system’s balance sheet: . If international reserves are 
targeted to increase as the current account or inflow of external finance improves, then 
government debt  must fall via a larger fiscal surplus. This exercise is the basis 
for the “twin” fiscal/foreign deficits which are at the heart of IMF financial programming.  
Along with twin deficit hawks worldwide, the Fund implicitly assumes that 
causality runs from the fiscal to foreign deficit, but as we saw in Chapter 5, it can easily 
go the other way. Furthermore, as we pointed out there, these particular twins are not 
frequently observed in the data. Roughly parallel movements of external financing and 
private net borrowing flows are a more frequent phenomenon. 
 Stage I accounts also support the basic closed economy monetarist inflation 
model, set out by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell in the late nineteenth century 
and propagandized worldwide by Milton Friedman and disciples as recently as the 
1970s and 1980s. The logic is that a higher fiscal deficit gets “monetized” (because the 
government cannot place debt obligations except with the central bank). Still on the 
assumptions that money demand equals supply, and that economic activity (X) is 
constantly at full employment, the resulting increase in forces  to go up, as 
determined by the equation of exchange written in the form . 
 Because liquidity in many economies now comprises a spectrum of financial 
assets and liabilities far wider than simple money, financial programming and monetarist 
inflation models are often anachronistic. Inflation in Zimbabwe, which took off in the mid-




Finally, it is worth noting that even in simple Stage I finance (and certainly in the 
more complicated systems discussed below), financial manias can appear in “abnormal” 
circumstances. Unfortunately, such situations have arisen pretty regularly for the last 
400 years.4 
 One familiar scenario is based on government assets  (with an asset price 
) which have been privatized and sold through a dealer to the public.5 If the dealer 
happens to have a captive bank at his disposal, he can lend money to himself and 
cronies to bid up the share place leading to a capital gain (or on-going inflation) at rate 
: the asset price rises to . Other actors may then start borrowing from the 
captive and other banks to try to buy shares, setting off a boom that ends inevitably in a 
crash. 
Premiere examples were the Mississippi and South Sea crises early in the 
eighteenth century, in which John Law’s Banque Générale in Paris and the Swordblade 
Bank in London issued the loans. With international complications discussed below, the 
Chilean crisis of 1982-83 followed the same pattern around companies privatized by 
Pinochet’s Chicago Boys. These examples illustrate a recurring theme in financial 
instability: capital gains are financed by liquidity in the form of liabilities assumed by 
financial actors to buy the appreciating assets. Manifold possibilities along these lines 
are sketched below.  
                                                            
4 Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) is the classic narrative. 
5 The “assets” might be claims on hypothetical future revenue streams (the South Sea 
and Mississippi cases discussed below) or equity of former state enterprises (a 




Stage II Finance 
The key element in “Stage II” is a domestic market in (at least short term) 
government and/or central bank debt. It may have been created by careful husbandry 
on the part of the central bank. We first sketch banking system interactions in such a 
system, and then take up broader issues. This discussion brings many more entries in 
Table 6.1 into action. 
The conventional treatment of Stage II is to assume that government bonds are 
held by both the private sector and banks, . In outline form, 
Keynes in the 1930s thought in terms of this sort of finance, with the significant 
extension of having markets in corporate debt instruments as well.  
In developing countries today, the central bank will often offer in the market its 
own bonds, , which constitute a non-monetary liability of the institution and may be 
held by the public and commercial banks, . A major advantage of this 
practice is that it is easier to develop a market for central bank bonds than a fully 
fledged set of transactions for government (not to mention corporate) paper. The central 
bank may also provide commercial banks with direct lending or advances (from a 
rediscount window or by injecting funds directly into interbank overnight credit markets) 
which commercial banks can then use to increase their own loans  and thereby money 
. Finally, we should consider commercial bank own-funds or equity , held by the 
private sector as an asset. 
Four monetary policy instruments can be illustrated with the table.  
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As noted for Stage I, shifting the reserve requirement  is a traditional control 
mechanism. As discussed below, this simple tool can be used in attempts to “sterilize” 
or offset credit and money expansion resulting from increases in international reserves 
. But deposit reserve requirements usually generate a strong opposition from 
commercial banks because these institutions are forced to hold deposits that they 
cannot lend and therefore increase the cost of financial intermediation. Other monetary 
policy tools can also be used. 
For example, the central bank can increase or decrease its own lending, , to 
encourage commercial banks to expand or contract their loan book. 
More importantly, open market operations become feasible when commercial 
banks or the private sector hold significant amounts of government and/or central bank 
bonds. Once enough of these instruments are traded in the market, to expand the 
money supply the central bank can buy bonds from commercial banks by crediting their 
deposits  of high-powered money. Or it can buy bonds from private agents who then 
place the funds in the banking system as deposits. With excess reserves on hand, the 
banks have an incentive to increase  and . A complication is that in a crisis 
commercial banks may prefer to hold higher quantities of government or central bank 
bonds rather than lend to the private sector. This sort of “liquidity trap” is unfortunately 




In turn, to contract the money supply, the central bank can sell bonds to the 
banks or the private sector. The objective here is to reduce both the money supply and 
lending to the private sector by commercial banks (  and , respectively). 
Finally, contemporary approaches to regulation such as the internationally 
accepted standards issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation – widely 
known as Basel I and II — focus on bank capital . Complications are taken up 
below. 
Turning to macroeconomics more generally, it remains true that primary liquidity 
in Stage II is still money. Keynesian ideas about liquidity preference come into play, with 
the interest rate mediating portfolio choice between more liquid money and less liquid 
bonds (with government and central bank bonds being more liquid than those of the 
corporate sector, which are subject to interest rate spreads associated with both liquidity 
and solvency risks). As far as the private sector is concerned, the liquidity spectrum still 
spans a collection of assets, with specific holdings responding to returns and costs. 
If a corporate bond market exists, it can be of significant support to capital 
formation. But even without one, Stage II governments can issue bonds to fund national 
development banks specialized in production-oriented loans. As discussed in Chapter 8, 
such institutions have been very important in developing countries; they played a 
significant post-war reconstruction role in advanced economies as well. 
Finally, Keynes analyzed financial instability in terms of sharp shifts in liquidity 
preference. Mixed with overborrowing (high leverage), they provide the foundation for 
Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis” (Minsky, 1982). The essential insight here is 
that as the confidence of private agents builds up during the boom, they tend to over-
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borrow – from the banks or in corporate bond markets — to buy real assets subject to 
capital gains (speculation in financial assets will come in later stages), pay for 
investment, or even to increase consumption. 
Sooner or later the borrowers can end up in very risky positions. Even if they 
were initially secure in the sense of having enough income to cover investment and 
interest payments (a hedged position), they can increase borrowing and spending to the 
point where current revenues become insufficient to pay for investment (speculative 
position), or even for interest payments (Ponzi finance). This sets the stage for a crisis 
when the end of the credit boom that sustains the borrowing exposes these positions. 
There can be a credit squeeze as creditors turn risk averse and move into larger 
holdings of money or government bonds.  
In microeconomic terms, the squeeze can be seen as a case of rationing on the 
part of creditors in a world with “asymmetric information” (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). 
When risk perceptions rise, it may be rational for lenders to stop giving credit altogether 
to those borrowers that are viewed as risky rather than charge them a larger risk 
premium that would in fact further increase the risk of lending to them. This is the 
simplest form of a cycle of “appetite for risk” followed by “flight to quality.” More complex 
versions are discussed below. 
Although Keynes was certainly aware of possibilities for financial instability 
involving credit booms and asset bubbles, they do not figure prominently in either the 
Treatise on Money or the General Theory. Certainly in the post-1929 world he was 
analyzing, the use of liabilities as liquidity to acquire assets (allegedly) subject to capital 
gains was not an immediate threat. 
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Stage III Finance 
In “Stage III” foreign financial capital comes onto the scene. The economy gets 
access to hard currency foreign loans (  to the private sector and e  to the 
government, expressed in domestic prices). Many countries and regions have gone 
through such a transition – Austria and Germany around 1930 when bank deposits from 
foreigners were used to acquire domestic assets leading into the Credit-Anstalt crash 
and Western Europe when capital markets were liberalized in the 1970s. 
 This may be seen as the typical stage in which developing countries are placed 
today. Before the recent commodity price boom, sub-Saharan African countries had 
seen little development in their financial structures that would take them beyond Stage II 
or even Stage I, as they continued to be deprived of access to private external 
financing. In a growing group of developing countries, however, the importance of bond 
markets, especially central bank and government bonds, has been on the rise and over 
the years, and they have fared better in attracting external private finance, even if in an 
unstable way. These countries may be said to be firmly based in Stage III financing.6 
The key point is that external liabilities become a form of liquidity which can be 
used to acquire assets at home. Local actors such as the government may or may not 
be able to issue liabilities aboard denominated in domestic currency (such as 
government borrowing  in Table 6.1). If they cannot, the limitation is quaintly called 
“original sin” in the academic literature. But Stage III sinners in good standing with their 
                                                            
6 The World Bank’s database on Financial Structure (World Bank, 2006) provides 
indicators on the size of equity and public and private bond markets for both developed 
and developing countries. These indicators can be used to group regions and countries 




creditors are welcome to borrow in foreign currency terms. Unfortunately this situation 
may not persist. 
The presence of foreign liabilities in portfolios immediately exposes their holders 
to exchange rate risk due to currency misalignment – or mismatch. If their assets and 
expected net revenues are denominated in domestic currency but their liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currency, then an increase in the exchange rate e generates 
both capital and income losses. The higher rate cuts directly into net worth and jacks up 
the cost of debt service. The threat to balance sheets is greater if (as has often been the 
case) there is a maturity mismatch involving short-term foreign liabilities and long-term 
domestic assets. 
These dangers are especially grave for actors such as firms producing non-
traded goods and the government itself insofar as their main sources of income are set 
in local currency. Although some assets of exporters (e.g., the real estate that they own 
and their deposits in the domestic financial system) may be denominated in local 
currency and be subject to the same problems, they could be more than offset by the 
larger domestic value of their current and expected net income in foreign currency.       
Money and credit expansion due to the accumulation of international reserves 
during phases of booming capital inflows has become a persistent problem in emerging 
market economies.7 If there is a market in domestic bonds, the central bank can in 
principle sterilize the monetary effect of international reserve accumulation by selling its 
 
7 If the exchange rate e stays constant, the home country’s net foreign assets 
 can only change gradually over time via a surplus or deficit on 
current account. Hence a jump in foreign lending  or  must be met by an equal 




own or government paper in exchange for money in an open market operation, although 
at the risk of driving up interest rates which may then bring in still more foreign capital. 
Two other options for sterilization exist: reducing the public sector debt by 
running a budget surplus, or accumulating the domestic money generated by the 
additional international reserves as deposit reserves of commercial banks. These 
options are the only ones available if there is no well developed domestic debt market 
(that is, we are closer to Stage I in terms of domestic financing). A long sequence of 
currency crises shows that such interventions may be of limited effectiveness. 
 
Stage IV Finance 
Use of liabilities as a source of liquidity expands greatly in “Stage IV.” A local 
market for equity issued by the private sector can provide the trampoline. This is the 
stage where the most successful developing countries as well as some of the slow 
growing regions (Central and Eastern Europe and the semi-industrialized countries, in 
particular) are placed now or towards which they are moving. Historically, the 
emergence of significant stock markets dates from the 1990s in many developing 
countries (with privatization of state enterprises often providing the impetus) and is fairly 
recent even in non-Anglo Saxon industrialized economies. 
 In Table 6.1, the value of private sector shares outstanding is  with  as a 
price index and V a measure of outstanding volume.8 In a wonderful seventeenth 
                                                            
8 For the private non-financial sector, Table 6.1 follows the accounting convention of the 
flow of funds by treating equity outstanding as a “liability” and allowing non-zero net 
worth. To illustrate a point made earlier, in flow of funds terms Google has highly 
negative net worth because its stock market valuation vastly exceeds its tangible capital 
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century Dutch word, a Stage IV economy can enter into windhandel or “wind trade” 
based on the use of liabilities (and derivatives built around them) as sources of liquidity. 
This possibility is reflected in Table 6.1’s “finance” sector which holds shares  
financed by borrowing from banks and abroad (ignore the  term from the moment). 
The sector’s equity or net worth is , held by the private sector as an asset. 
Within the financial sector, there are offsetting asset and liability entries . 
Individual financial actors such as broker-dealers, financial agents active in mortgage 
bond markets (e.g., some pension funds in developing countries, or Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in the US), and hedge funds can borrow from one another but for their 
subsystem as a whole many of these transactions will be mutually offsetting.9 By 
increasing transactions such as , financial institutions can add to cash flow as they 
build up asset/equity or leverage ratios . The liabilities  
underlying total assets  can support imposing structures of leverage and 
liquidity.10 
So long as  continues to rise, growing intra-financial sector claims make it 
possible to mobilize large sums of money to buy stock. Of course  can also fall, 
precipitating a collapse. Again, appetite for risk during a boom becomes flight to quality 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and financial assets. On a balance sheet set up to follow accountants’ conventions, 
Google like all other corporations would have zero net worth. 
9 They may not offset completely. In available US flows of funds data, for example, 
leveraged financial institutions typically have negative net positions in fed funds and 
security repurchase (repo) agreements. Gross repo asset and liability positions are not 
reported. 
10 In the US at the end of 2007, leverage for households was around 1.2, for commercial 
banks it was about 10, and for investment banks it was over 30! 
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in a crash marked by “deleveraging” or a contraction of liquidity in the form of liabilities 
and a retreat to assets such as government bonds and even money. 
The financial sector can also be dependent on the rest of the world. If local 
operators borrow heavily from abroad (  in Table 6.1) and invest at home ample 
possibilities arise for currency and maturity misalignments in national balance sheets of 
the sort that led to the succession of emerging market financial crises in the 1990s. 
Diversified finance as in Stage IV also creates opportunities. Somewhat 
surprisingly, firms in Chapter 3’s rapidly growing economies have relied on selling new 
shares for a significant portion of their investment finance, certainly not the practice in 
many advanced economies where share buybacks predominate (Singh, 1995; Staritz, 
2008). Active stock markets also allow entrepreneurs to cash in on their innovations via 
initial public offerings (IPOs) of shares, a significant incentive for technological advance. 
 
Stage V Finance 
“Stage V” finance – not yet significant in most developing economies – adds the 
contemporary twist of asset securitization. In just one of many possible examples, 
suppose that besides productive capital the private sector holds a tangible asset  with 
price  (the obvious example is residential housing). It borrows  (for “mortgages”) 
from banks, using  as collateral. The banks in turn bundle the mortgages into a 
security  with price  which is sold to financial actors. Such maneuvers make it 
possible to borrow large sums of money and pump up leverage by increasing claims on 
the non-financial sector. 
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But there are also problems. How to evaluate collateral for securitized loans is 
one. Aside from ample opportunities for fraud, a key point in recent US experience is 
that the housing collateral for “subprime” mortgages was itself subject to capital gains 
and losses, and that the ability of the borrowers to be able to meet their payment 
obligations was open to question (without, needless to say, any prior provision being 
made on the part of the lenders during the upswing for the loan losses they  were likely 
to incur during the succeeding downswing).11 To the extent that these assets  were 
traded, they  were valued at market prices (mark-to-market). Rating agencies were  
asked to judge as to their quality before they were  marketed, and changed the rating 
through time. A capital gain on the primary asset (housing) led directly to a jump in the 
asset price  which stimulated balance sheet expansion. 
Secondly, a large portion of these complex securities were not marketed. They 
were given a hypothetical valuation  based on mathematical models internal to the 
financial institutions. These procedures were flawed, as we will see below. But they 
were a wonderful source of liquidity until the bottom fell out of the subprime market, 
carrying down with it the values of securitized assets. Then a crisis hit, with drastic 
deleveraging and shrinkage of liquidity.  
 As this book went to the press, the industrialized economies are still sorting out 
the consequences of deleveraging Stage V. But it seems clear that public regulation of 
both bank and non-bank financial operations can help reduce the likelihood of booms 
                                                            
11 In US usage, subprime mortgages are not of sufficient quality to be bought and 
securitized by the government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 




and crashes. Financial safety nets can be constructed. However, when liquidity takes 
the form of liabilities which can be used to pay for profit-seeking in financial markets (not 
to mention fees for the people who “guide” investors), sources of potential volatility will 
always appear, even in constricted early stage financial systems. 
 
Pro-Cyclical Regulatory Complications 
Stage V but also Stage III and IV finance raises numerous problems of 
regulation. As noted above, the Basel I and II standards concentrate on commercial 
bank capital. Besides issuing equity per se, banks also make provisions (or reserves) 
for expected losses in their loan portfolio. They are held in liquid assets and add to the 
net worth of the banks as they are built up, but are expected to be spent sometime in 
the future when losses are made. For simplicity in notation, we assume that they are 
part of bank capital . When a bank gets into trouble, it has to use the provisions it 
has accumulated or reduce its leverage by disposing of assets or building up equity. 
Cutting shareholder dividends and/or selling new stock are the usual mechanisms for 
the latter. Examples were rife in the industrialized economies in 2007-08. For 
developing countries at higher stages of finance, the Basel methodology which sets 
targets for how much capital and provisions financial firms have to hold as backing for 
assets is increasingly relevant. We provide a brief sketch with emphasis on the 
problems it may present.12  
                                                            
12 There is an enormous literature on the Basel standards. The discussion here draws 
heavily on Alexander et. al. (2008). 
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 Basel II rests on three “pillars”, with the first being that a bank should maintain 
capital and provisions adequate to guarantee that if there is an adverse shock to its 
assets, there will be only a small probability of a loss. The bank’s assets should be 
valued on the basis of market parameters (interest rates, expected losses given market 
conditions, etc.), including to the extent possible asset prices set in relevant markets 
that can be used to value such holdings (mark-to-market pricing).  
Pillar One emphasizes that such calculations should be based on the bank’s 
internal risk weighting models and could take into account the information provided by 
the ratings agencies. In developing countries, however, few assets are rated by these 
agencies. Some asset-backed securities are rated in industrial countries but the more 
complex rarely trade, so there is no market on the basis of which to estimate values. 
Furthermore, even in industrial countries, the loan portfolio is not rated and is only 
imperfectly tradable. When it has to be sold during a crisis, discounts can be 
considerable.  
The complicated mathematics used for asset valuation creates problems of its 
own. A major consideration is that going into the 2007 crisis all financial institutions 
were using models based on the same theory (the basics involving comparisons of 
returns and risks described by hypothetically known probability distributions go back to 
Markowitz, 1952) and estimated using the same historical data. There was already a lot 
of homogeneity built into their market perceptions. Worse still, the models presuppose 
that financial actors can always trade at stable “market-determined” prices. As we 
pointed out above, this assumption is inapplicable for many assets and, equally 
important, fails for those assets for which there is a market if all the players are thinking 
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more or less the same thing and then change their minds in the same direction – not 
everybody can attempt to buy or sell at the same time without causing prices to move! 
Similar perceptions then lead to greater asset price volatility. Marking-to-market turns 
highly pro-cyclical, as assets are overpriced during booms but possibly underpriced in 
the environment of pessimism that prevails during crises. 
Such herd behavior was exacerbated by Basel Pillar Three calling for market 
discipline enforced by greater disclosure of banks’ financial status and their internal risk 
management procedures. Such measures were not the most effective means to 
confront systemic risk caused by the herding behavior discussed above – an externality 
not encompassed by internal procedures and not accounted for in the market place. 
Supervision, the second Pillar, could potentially deal with this problem, but evidence 
indicates that it is ignored or seriously underutilized until crises actually strike.  
To understand in a more formal way the source of the problem, we should 
observe that major financial actors generally operated on the basis of “value at risk” or  
as estimated by their models. Value at risk is linked to the equity capital  that the firm 
must hold to stay solvent with high probability (Adrian and Shin, 2008). Firms 
presumably adjust their balance sheets to target a ratio of economic capital  to , say:  
    . 
With  as their assets, leverage  then becomes: 
      .         (1) 
These are all static relationships, supported by models with probability 
distributions estimated from existing data at a point in time. The dangers they create 
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result from their impacts on the dynamic behavior of financial firms. The heart of the 
matter is that leverage responds inversely to asset price increases. In highly simplified 
form, a firm’s balance sheet can be written as: 
       
with  as debt. 
Suppose that there is a capital gain on a firm’s assets. If debt stays constant for 
the moment, equity  will rise by an equal absolute amount. Because  for 
financial firms, the proportional increase in  markedly exceeds that in . Hence 
leverage or  goes down. Financial firms then have a strong incentive to 
increase debt to buy additional assets to build up leverage, engaging in windhandel to 
profit from increased cash flow while still respecting pre-set limits on risk. In the 
subprime mortgage adventure, firms were typically borrowing short-term to acquire 
long-term assets in anticipation of capital gains – back to the Mississippi and South Sea 
Companies of 300 years ago! 
So what happens if asset prices go down? Leverage jumps up, and from 
equation (1) above,  increases for a given . With greater value at risk relative to 
assets, Basel rules obligate the firm to reduce leverage by disposing of assets or 
building up equity. If firms are largely similar and react in much the same way to an 
adverse shock, the resulting fire sale of assets can lead to dramatic price reductions 
and a liquidity conflagration as in 2007-08. 
As we will see in Chapter 7, there are ways to attenuate this behavior, basically 
building rules that try to correct for the pro-cyclical behavior of financial and asset 
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markets. In practice, in industrial and developing countries alike, , crises hit when 
financial institutions are seriously undercapitalized (after all, undercapitalization is the 
other side of the coin of large profits made during the boom on the basis of high 
leverage). The sales of assets in markets with one-sided expectations then lead to 





            Table 6.1: Illustrative Balance Sheets (“T-accounts”) 
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         Government                   Rest of the World     Finance 
 
                                                                              
 
                                                                               
 
                                                           
 
                             
 
 
 Total wealth:  
 Net foreign assets:  
 Bank loan balance:  
           Government bond balance:  
 Central Bank bond balance:  
 Foreign loan balance:   
 Equity balance:  
 Mortgage balance:  
 
